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I. STA TEMENT OF THE CASE

This action is one to modify an existing divorce decree to order a continuing
obligation of child support past the age of eighteen years based upon the alleged disability
of the child. The Appellant also seeks an order that he is entitled to a vehicle of his
choosing pursuant to an alleged oral and indefinite promise made by John Stanger and his
ex-wife, and that he is entitled to back child support payments, based upon the Decree of
Divorce between his parents.
II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I.

Was the District Court correct that there were no genuine issues of material fact
and that Plaintiff/Appellant's claims should be dismissed as a matter of law?

2.

Did the District Court treat Plaintiff/Appellant in a fair, non-discriminatory
manner?

3.

Is either party entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

Ill.

ARGUMENT

A.

The District Court Was Correct in Granting Summary
Judgment on All Claims
1.

The District Court Correctly Applied the Law
Regarding Summary Judgment and Burden of Proof

In his brief, Appellant sets forth at length case law on the issue of summary judgment and
burdens of proof. However, he fails to state specifically on what issues the legal burden of proof
was impermissibly shifted in this case. Rather, Appellant merely states "the Defendant had not
properly completed their burden of production on many of the issues they raised for Summary
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Judgment," without ever setting forth specifically what those issues were. (Appellant's Brie±: at
60). In fact, Respondents did meet their burden on each of the issues raised in their motion for
summary judgment.
First, Respondents made several legal arguments that were not fact dependent and did not
require any affirmative factual showing. For example, Respondents argued that as a matter of
law, there was no cause of action for child support after the age of majority in the State of Idaho.
This argument did not require any affirmative factual proof and was more akin to a motion to
dismiss. Next Respondents argued that even if such a cause of action were recognized, Appellant
would have had to have been disabled at the age of majority under the standards set forth in prior
case law. Respondents pointed to the lack in the record of any finding of disability at the age of
eighteen which would have prevented Appellant from supporting himself. Appellant did not set
forih any additional evidence to support a claim that he was unable to support himself due to
disability at the time he reached majority.
The issue of disability has been confused by the Appellant in this matter. There are
different types of disability with differing legal implications. For example, Appellant may have
been born prematurely with certain learning disabilities that would make an EIP in school
necessary. These "disabilities" might not equate to a finding of "disabled" for SSDI. For
purposes of the case law addressing future child supp01i for a child "disabled" at the age of
majority, this Court has held that there must be a finding that the disability prevents the child
from earning a living:
Such parent's legal liability for the support of a competent child
ceases when the child, not then in a feeble or dependent condition,
mentally or physically, as to be unable to support itself, reaches the
2

age of majority.

State ex rel. Cromwell v. Panzeri, 76 Idaho 211,214,280 P.2d 1064, 1065-66 (1955) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted). Thus, once Respondents established that the record was devoid of
evidence that his disability rendered him unable to support himself, the burden shifted to
Appellant and he did not place evidence into the record in support of the claim that he was
unable to support himself due to a disability at the time he turned eighteen (not just that he didn't
suppo11 himself, but that he was unable due to his disability to support himself).
Next, Respondents argued that in other states that recognize a duty to pay child support to
an adult child, consideration must be given to the resources and ability of the parent to pay such
support. In this case, Respondents filed the Affidavit of Christy Walbuck, Conservator for John
Stanger, who stated that John Stanger is on a fixed income, is himself disabled, and his
discretionary income must be used for his own care. (CR Vol. 4, at 576). This shifted the burden
to Appellant, who did not respond with any conflicting evidence of his father's ability to pay
child supp011.
With respect to the Appellant's claims regarding past child support he claims was due,
Respondents also made the argument that, as a matter of law, Appellant was not the proper party
to bring such a cause of action and that the District Comi was not the proper forum. These were
legal, not factual claims. With respect to the factual claims that Appellant had already received
more child support than he was due, the facts put into the record by Appellant himself supported
that conclusion. Likewise, with respect to the statute of limitations arguments on the potential
oral contract claim, the facts in the record supported Respondents' claims.
In sum, despite the broad allegations made in Appellant's brief with respect to the law on
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summary judgment, when the Court looks at the specific issues and the specific facts, it is clear
that the District Court properly allocated the burdens of proof and correctly determined that
summary judgment was proper on all claims. Respondents did in fact meet their burden with
respect to the summary judgment standard in this case.
2.

The District Court Decision Should Be Upheld

In its order granting summary judgment, the District Court first addressed the Appellant's
claims for back child support. The District Court correctly determined that any issues regarding
the enforcement of the Decree of Divorce entered in Canyon County Case No. CV 2006-483-C,
were properly heard before the magistrate court that entered the decree and not in District Court.
The claims for back child support and contempt were properly dismissed on that basis.
However, had the District Court exercised its jurisdiction, summary judgment on those
claims would have still been appropriate for the following reasons. First, Appellant is not the
proper party to pursue these claims. He is not a party to the Decree of Divorce, and was
not entitled to the child support payments, his mother, Vicki Stanger was.
Second, the time for pursuing any alleged child support arrearage has passed. The
Decree of Divorce was entered on March 30, 2006. Appellant turned eighteen on April
28, 2006. Even if it could be argued that he was in high school at that time, he reached
the age of nineteen on April 28, 2007. This action was commenced on August 14, 2012,
over five years after Appellant turned nineteen. The time for pursuing a claim under the
Decree for child support arrearage has passed.
Finally, even if child support were owed for the 13 months after the Decree was
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entered until Appellant turned nineteen, that amount would only total $4,753.45 ($365.65
x 13 months). Appellant admitted to receiving $6,500.00 in support payments from
Defendant between March 2006 and February 2011. (CR Vol. 4, at 685).
Accordingly, Appellant's claims for back support were properly dismissed, either
on the basis that the District Court was not the proper forum in which to bring such
claims, or for the substantive reasons that Appellant was not the proper party to bring the
claims, the claims were time-barred and that no back support is owing because Appellant
admits to having received more than the amount of back support allegedly owed by his
father.
Next the District Court addressed Appellant's claims for an oral contract for a vehicle and
driving lessons. The District Court dismissed the claim for the reason that there was not
sufficient evidence in the record to support the fact that an oral contract existed and setting forth

its specific terms. The District Court correctly noted that the facts regarding the specifics of the
alleged agreement were not provided by affidavit or other means, and therefore dismissed the
claim for oral contract.
However, had there been facts to suppo1i the claim of oral contract, the claim would have
been still subject to dismissal based upon the four year statute of limitations on oral contracts.

See Idaho Code § 5-217.
Finally, the District Court addressed Appellant's claims for future child suppmi and
dismissed those claims on the basis that there is no continuing basis for child support after the
age of nineteen under Idaho law. The Comi also held that, if there were law to support a claim
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for child support for a child disabled at the age of majority, Appellant did not place evidence in
the record to support his claims that he was disabled and unable to support himself at the time he
reached majority. Additionally, the District Court found that even if Appellant were entitled to
support, that right would have to be balanced with the ability of Respondent to pay support and
the uncontested evidence ofrecord demonstrated that Respondent's income was necessary for his
own needs and to handle his own disability.
Based upon the foregoing, the District Comi was correct in dismissing Appellant's claims
and that decision should be upheld.
B.

The District Court Did Not Treat Appellant in an Impermissible or
Discriminatory Manner

Appellant next argues that he was treated in a discriminatory manner by the District Court
due to his disability. In reality, Appellant was treated with respect and there is simply no
evidence that the fact of his disability had any impact on the District Court's decision regarding
summary judgment.
Appellant seems to believe that the District Court granted summary judgment against him
in part because of his disability. However, the District Court properly granted summary
judgment based upon all the arguments set forth above. There is simply no evidence that the
District Comi discriminated against Appellant in reaching his decision.
Rather, the District Court inquired as to Appellant's mental status in an attempt to
determine whether there was any evidence that he might be incompetent, such that a guardian or
a conservator need be appointed on his behalf. All of the District Cami's discussion with
Appellant had to do with his legal capacity to make decisions for himself in the proceeding, not
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with his underlying disability.
Here is where Appellant again confuses the legal implications of the term "disability" in
different contexts. While Appellant may be ·'disabled'' under the SSDI determinations as to his
ability to work, or for purposes of an EIP in school, these determinations do not mean that he
does not have the power to contract, or make a will or file and pursue a court action pro se.
However, given the allegations of mental disability in the Complaint, the District Comi was
merely trying to determine whether there were any general capacity issues that would prevent
Appellant from proceeding prose. The District Court recognized the Appellant's disability and
made inquiry to determine whether that disability implicated his capacity to represent himself.
The District Court concluded that it did not.
Specifically, the District Court explained:
As an initial matter, the court has made a determination that the
Plaintiff is competent to proceed with this action despite his claims
that he has been diagnosed with disabilities over the course of his
life, and is currently receiving disability benefits for a mental
health related diagnosis. At the hearing on this motion, the com1
made special inquiry of the Plaintiff to ensure that he understood
the proceedings, that he did not feel it necessary to be represented
by a guardian, and that the Plaintiff himself had researched and
prepared the extensive filings in this action. The court is satisfied,
after having observed the Plaintiff in court and based upon his
ability to research and write the documents filed in this action, that
the Plaintiff is not so impaired that the court would be
uncomfortable moving forward with the determination of this
motion on the merits.
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 4 (CR Vol. 5, at 781). The entire
discussion of Appellant's mental status in this context had to do with his capacity to appear for
himself in court and did not have anything to do with the underlying claims in the case.
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Appellant's citations to the Americans with Disabilities Act are not relevant, as this case
does not involve a claim against Judge Ford for discrimination. Additionally, whether Appellant
is disabled and entitled to protections under the ADA is irrelevant to the issue Judge Ford
addressed at the hearing of this matter: whether there was any evidence that Appellant lacked
capacity to transact business and whether he needed a guardian or conservator.
Appellant was treated by the District Court with respect and there is no support for his
current claims of discrimination.
C.

Plaintiff/Appellant Is Not Entitled To Attorney Fees on Appeal

Appellant is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal, even if he were to be the prevailing
party, for the reason that he is pro se and has not incurred any attorney fees. Appellant has not
provided any compelling reason for the Comi to disregard its established authority and overturn
the case law holding that pro se litigants are not entitled to fees.

D.

Attorney Fees On Appeal

Respondents moved for attorney fees before the District Court pursuant to Rule 54(e)( 1),
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and LC.§ 12-121. That motion was granted and Respondents
were awarded costs and fees before the District Court. Respondents should be awarded attorney
fees and costs on appeal on the same basis.
Idaho Appellate Courts have explained that "[a]n award of attorney fees under J.C. § 12121 is appropriate when the trial court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the
action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation."
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); ~McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551,562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003); Nampa &
A1eridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 524, 20 P.3d 702, 708 (2001).
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In this case, looking at the fact that the case was brought in the wrong court, with a nearly
undecipherable 164 page complaint, seeking a remedy not recognized by the Idaho legislature or
this Court, it was brought unreasonably and without foundation in law. The contract and back
child support claims were similarly brought without foundation in fact and the child support
enforcement claim was pursued without standing. Additionally, the action was pursued in such a
manner as to escalate costs and fees. For example, Appellant continued to asse1i claims for
default, which were unfounded and unreasonable. Before this Court, the Appellant filed an brief
that violated the requirements of the Court and then filed an excessive brief arguing with this
Comi's order on briefing. The Appellant's brief addresses arguments not made before the
District Court and attacks the District Court personally.
Respondents recognize and respect the fact that Appellant represented himself in this
matter. However, that does not give Appellant license to pursue unfounded claims to the
detriment of Respondents.
As noted in prior briefing and through the Affidavit Christy Walbuck, Respondent is
disabled and on a limited income. Defending this action has continued to tax his already meager
resources. Given that fact, and the fact that the action was brought and pursued frivolously and
without foundation, Respondents respectfully request an award of attorney fees on appeal.
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Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request the order of the District Court
dismissing this case in its entirety be affirmed and request an award of attorney fees and costs
incurred in defending this appeal.

·"00~
DATED this L
_ day of March, 2014.
RINGERT CLARK CHARTERED

V.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

~ of March, 2014, two true and correct copies of the

O

foregoing were served upon all paiiies listed below by:

~Mail D Fax

D By Hand D Overnight

Andrew Barrett Mefford-Stanger
14524 South Ben Apple Way - Apt.# B
Edwall, WA 99008-9600
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